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Standard interpretations of the history of public health in New York City in the twentieth
century describe either the decline or the growth of the importance accorded to public health
activities. To the contrary, public health has, paradoxically, both declined in salience and
attracted increasing resources.
This article describes the politics of public health in New York City since the 1920s. First it
describes events in the history of public health in the context of events in the economy and in
city, state, and national politics. Then it proposes three descriptive models for arraying the data
about public health politics: accretion, reform, and crisis. Next it describes how the politics of
AIDS in NewYorkCity in the 1980swas aconsequenceofthe history that produced these three
political styles. Finally, it argues that the three political styles are generalizable to the history of
public health throughout the United States in the twentieth century.
Most accounts ofthe history ofpublic health in New York City between the 1920s
and the 1980s describe either the decline or the growth of public health activities.
Advocates ofthe hypothesis ofdecline claim that the enterprise ofpublic health has
been less prominent in the life ofthe city than it was between the 1880s and the First
World War, theyears dominated by the innovative policies ofHermann N. Biggs and
his colleagues [1]. The evidence they present to demonstrate decline includes
diminished priority accorded by mayors to the Department ofHealth in comparison
with other city agencies, the tolerance by public health professionals of inefficient
political appointees within the Department, and the transfer of such public health
functions as hospital administration and environmental protection to newly created
agencies.
The advocates of the growth hypothesis emphasize that the activities defined as
publichealth and the resources allocated to them increased enormously duringthese
seven decades [2]. The enterprise of public health within the city has, they claim,
expanded throughout the century, in both the public and the voluntary sectors. By
any measure-money spent, employees, publicity, regulation and its enforcement-
public health has become more, rather than less, prominent within the city over the
years.
Each ofthese hypotheses is incomplete. There isconsiderable evidence thatpublic
health was more prominent on the agenda ofthe city's political leaders at the turn of
the century than it has subsequently been. But there is also evidence that the
enterprise ofpublic health has continued toexpand inboth size and scope since then.
Moreover, significant changes occurred in the politics ofpublic health while it was,
paradoxically, both declining in salience and attracting increasing resources. These
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changes made it possible for public health professionals in the city to complain that
theywere underappreciated even as their authority and appropriations grew.
This article is an inquiry into the political history of public health in New York
City. I propose atheory, lessgrandly aframework, forinterpretingwhat appear tobe
chaotic andcontradictory events. The essay ishistorical, but it is not strict chronolog-
ical history. I begin bycharacterizing the politics ofpublic health in the city since the
1920s. Then I present three political styles that have been employed by the public
officials, health professionals, and leaders ofvoluntary organizations who have been
themajorparticipants in the enterprise ofpublic health. I call these styles the politics
of accretion, of reform, and of crisis [3]. Each of the three styles is, in the technical
language of social science, a descriptive model, an abstraction that is intended to
assist readers in interpreting masses of data. Finally, I will briefly explain how the
politics ofAIDS in New YorkCity in the 1980swas a consequence ofthe history that
produced these three political styles.
Throughout this article I use an empirical definition ofpublic health: it is what the
people who define its politics and policy at any time say it is. The activities people
describe aspublic health change overtime andvary among professionals and leaders
of interest groups at any time. I use the phrase "the enterprise of public health" to
encompass the definitions used by influential actors in the history ofpublic health in
New York City at particular times during the past seven decades. The enterprise of
public health has always been broader than the mandate ofthe city's Department of
Health. Thus at times some readers will be tempted to say, "But that's not public
health." Such temptations should be interpreted as warnings that the reader is
imposing order retroactively on an untidy past.
The definitions ofthe enterprise ofpublic health that have been used in the years
described in this article do, however, have two unchanging elements. One is that
public health includes whatever influences the health status of populations. The
other is that it includes most preventive, many diagnostic, and some therapeutic
services for the poor and the medicallyindigent.
PUBLIC HEALTH IN CITY POLITICS
The importance of public health on the political agenda of New York City
government diminished gradually in the 1920s andvery rapidlybeginning in the early
1930s. The major cause ofthis diminutionwas the increase ofpublic responsibility in
other areas of policy. When Hermann N. Biggs began to dominate the policy and
politics ofpublic health in New York, in the mid-1880s, the city had no subways, few
bridges, no massive public housing projects and hospitals built with the assistance of
federal funds, and no responsibility for providing relief to the poor in their own
homes. The population ofthe city was considerably smaller. During the first decade
of Biggs's ascendancy, the political city consisted only of Manhattan and the Bronx.
The largest influx of immigrants and internal migrants occurred in the decade after
1900. During the city's annual budget negotiating season, aggressive public health
leaders competed for resources mainly with their counterparts, who administered
the police, the courts, and public construction [4].
The diminished importance of public health on the political agenda of city
government was evident during the first administration of Mayor Fiorello La
Guardia, from 1933 to 1937. The Mayor paid attention to public health issues only
when theyoffered anopportunity tobring moneyand thereforejobs to the depressed
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city economy. Heworked hard to obtain federal construction money in order to build
two new public hospitals on what was then called Welfare (now Roosevelt) Island.
He gave attention to studies and new services that were paid for with federal funds
appropriated for employing the unemployed or allocated under the public health
titles of the new Social Security Act. He even scheduled his photo opportunities
involving public health-unlike, say, those involving police or fire services-to
display his skill in obtaining federal funds [5].
The pattern of agenda-setting in city government established in the first La
Guardia administration has persisted. Mayors, their aides, and other elected officials
have quietly supported increased public health budgets, especially when growth was
accompanied by new funds from the state or the federal government. These leaders
of general politics became involved in explicit issues of public health policy only
during crises, notably an epidemic or the threat ofone.
Moreover, the public health enterprise has grown most rapidly outside city
government in the past 70 years. This pattern of growth was evident in the 1920s,
when the Milbank Memorial Fund financed an expansion ofthe number and mission
of the health centers established a decade earlier by the city's health department.
The city's Department ofHospitals, carved out of the Health Department in the late
1920s, distributed increasing amounts of money in order to assist voluntary hospitals
and clinics to serve the poor and the medically indigent. In the early 1930s, voluntary
agencies conducted pioneering studies to comprehend the magnitude of chronic
disease and its implications for health services [6].
The most important public health innovation in the city during the 1930s, the
founding ofthe Associated Hospital Service (now called Empire Blue Cross) was the
work of voluntary agencies and a sympathetic state government. Blue Cross and,
later, commercial health insurance relieved the city and philanthropic agencies of
the cost of routine health care for many low-paid workers and the costs of cata-
strophic illness for many in the middle classes. When, in the third La Guardia
administration, political officials and civic reformers organized a prepaid group
practice alternative to fee-for-service medicine, initially to provide physicians' ser-
vices to city employees, the Health Insurance Plan, they contracted with Blue Cross
to cover hospitalization for its members [7].
In sum, the salience of public health on the agenda of general politics diminished
at the same time that the stakes in public health politics increased. As a result of this
double shift, intense competition for resources in public health occurred outside the
arenas of public debate. Health politics were not closed politics: no arena of sectoral
politics can remain closed forvery long in the United States. But key actors in health
politics have been more frequently accountable to interest groups alone than have
their counterparts in transportation, construction, zoning and urban development,
public housing, landlord/tenant relationships, or the police, fire, and criminal justice
systems.
The provider and professional interest groups to which key actors in public health
politics accounted have not been monolithic. There has been considerable conflict
among interest groups in health affairs. Within the medical profession, for example,
community practitioners who were specialists had different interests from those who
were generalists. Similarly, academic and community-based physicians increasingly
had conflicting interests (especially after the 1960s); public health physicians have
often been at odds with colleagues in other specialties, especially over the boundaries
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ofprevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Membersofdifferent professions frequently
struggled over matters of public health policy: optometrists and ophthalmologists,
forexample, disagreed aboutwho should prescribe corrective lensesforthepoorand
the medically indigent; nurses and social workers claimed professional territory
coveted by each other and by some physicians. Voluntary hospitals had a large stake
inincreasingtheirreimbursement frompublicfundsforthe care ofthe poor, often at
the expense ofpublic institutions. Blue Cross insisted on discounted hospital rates in
exchange for permitting its subscribers' payments to cross-subsidize treatment for
the poor and for enrolling at community rates people who were self-employed or
worked in small businesses. Commercial insurance companies resented the discount
to Blue Cross. These examples could be multiplied manytimes [8].
Moreover, public health politics became so fragmented that it sometimes seemed
artificial to talk of an enterprise of public health. In Biggs's time, the city's health
department struggled with professional interest groups about every issue bearing on
the health ofpopulations and medical servicesforthe poor. These struggles occurred
mainly within the city, with the occasional involvement of the New York Stale
Legislature.
Beginning in the 1930s and with increasing speed after the Second World War,
there were new issues, new players, and new arenas. The most significant new issues
were modem variants of older themes in public health. For instance, hospital
regulation, financing medical care for the poor, and protecting against environmen-
tal hazards had once been called hospital visiting, charity care, and sanitary inspec-
tion. But debates about these traditional issues now occurred in a new, national
arena. Moreover, state officials enlarged their role, making broader use of their
constitutional authority to determine the institutional governance, expenditures, and
tax levies ofcities.
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government replaced philanthropy and state
and local government as the major source of funds to construct and renovate
hospitals. The federal Hill-Burton program, named after the Act that created it in
1946, standardized the formula for distributing hospitals, especially outside major
cities, and manyaspects oftheir construction. It also strengthened the powerofstate
agencies, whose officials prepared the plans on the basis of which the federal
government allocated funds. Hill-Burton transformed public hospital politics in New
York City, ending the special relationship that Mayor La Guardia had established
with New Deal agencies that supplied funds for construction [9].
Hill-Burton also encouraged local advocates ofexpanded medical services for the
poor. The federal government, as the courts later decided in response to class-action
suits, chose not to enforce the standards for supplying care to the poor without
charge that were contained in the Act. But the standards provided a platform for
advocacy [10].
Events in the 1960s and 1970s strengthenedthe powerofthe states and thefederal
government in hospital affairs. Financing hospital and medical care for the poor, a
public health responsibility that had earlier been shared by philanthropy and city
government, became a high-stakes gamewith newplayers, beginning in the 1950s. In
the early 1950s, national legislation permitted city and state agencies to purchase
medical care for the poor from so-called "vendors" (private and non-profit provid-
ers), usingfederalwelfare funds. Alittle more than a decade later, the Medicare and
Medicaid programs made medical care for the poor a lucrative enterprise. Hospitals
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and clinics that had struggled tobalance theirbudgetswithgifts fromphilanthropists
and grants or vendor payments from government could now bill the federal govern-
ment's financial intermediaries and the state on the basis of fees and negotiated
charges. Moreover, the federal government set initial Medicare reimbursement rates
generously inordertomollifythe medical societies and hospitals that had threatened
to boycott the program. Teaching hospitals in New York and other cities realized
that thepatients onwhomtheyhadtraditionallylostmoney, the elderlyandthepoor,
now provided a greater proportion of their income than patients with Blue Cross or
commercial insurance. Medical school faculty members now discovered that their
teaching and research patients, whom they had recently treated without charge as a
matter of enlightened self-interest, could now generate funds for their institutions
and themselves. Not surprisingly, the gap between the earnings of medical faculty
and the net incomes oftheir colleagues in the community narrowed very quickly.
In the early 1960s, the purpose of state hospital policy changed. The purpose now
became regulation, especially of soaring hospital costs and payments, rather than
increasing the supply of facilities. In New York, Blue Cross and the State Health
Department pooled their considerable power in the early 1960s to create an official
mechanism to assess requests by hospitals to build, renovate, or-buy expensive
equipment. The mechanism was called certificate of need. It was implemented by a
newly created State Hospital Review and Planning Council. By the late 1960s, the
federal government could influence hospital revenues through its power to set rates
for Medicare, which accounted for a quarter to a halfofthe income ofevery hospital
in thecity. In 1969, NewYork stategovernmentbegan to set ratesforreimbursement
to hospitals from Blue Cross, as well as from Medicaid, and to certify the rates
hospitals charged to commercial insurers. In this context, city government, itself a
major provider of hospital care, often became indistinguishable from other interest
groups thatwere competing to influence state and federal policy.
The politics of health care financing in the United States became extraordinarily
complicated in the late 1960s. Skilled practitioners ofthese politics worked at every
levelofgovernment,withbothnon-profit andcommercialinsurers, andwith avariety
ofinterests in the medical specialties and other health professions.
What had been a reasonably narrow set of interests as recently as the 1940s had
been fragmented. Before the 1960s, city health officials, a handful of powerful
philanthropists and their staffs, and leaders ofa few medical societies could define a
community's responsibility for providing health care to the poor. By the 1960s, the
problemsofhealth careforthe poorwerebeyond the reach ofmost local actors, even
when they coalesced. Moreover, it was often beyond the comprehension of anyone
except experts who devoted their professional lives to the politics of health care
financing.
The new politics of race and ethnicity intensified the fragmentation ofthe politics
of health care facilities and financing. During and after the Second World War, the
black and Hispanic population of New York City increased rapidly. Public health
officials and leaders of interest groups became increasingly aware of blacks and
Hispanics as recipients of services and as employees, often the lowest-paid employ-
ees, of hospitals and other service agencies. The annual reports of the Health
Department took little notice of the changing demography ofthe city until the early
1950s. Then, under a new and vigorous Commissioner, Leona Baumgartner, there
was swift recognition of the significance of blacks and Hispanics for the politics of
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public health. This recognition was symbolized by the annual report of the Depart-
ment for 1953. For the first time, a third of the persons in public relations
photographs (17 of52) were recognizably black or Hispanic [11]. In the next several
decades, the bitter politics of race and ethnicity could never be ignored in competi-
tion for the resources allocated to public health. Beginning in the 1950s, moreover,
withthe earlyorganizingcampaignsforLocal 1199, theunionthatorganizedworkers
in voluntary hospitals, the politics of race and ethnicity were often expressed in
strikes, demonstrations, and angryconfrontations.
Similar fragmentation occurred in environmental policy. Beginning in the 1940s,
new agencies became responsible for issues that had long been addressed by public
health officials. The city created a new department of air pollution control in 1949.
Noise abatement was delegated to the traffic authorities. The new distribution of
environmental responsibilities in the citywas influencedbycorrespondingchanges at
the state and federal levels. By the 1980s, many areas of environmental regulation
and its politics had become almost totally separated from the politics of public
health.
THE LEGACY OF POLITICAL HISTORY
The political history I have summarized had a profound influence on the enter-
prise of public health in New York City. During most of the past 70 years, and
especially after the Second World War, most of the politics of public health has
occurred outside the view of the general public, of the media, and of the elected
officialswhopreside overgeneral-purpose government. Public health has intersected
with general politics on relatively few occasions, in comparison with other areas of
civiclife. These occasions have been, mainly, thefinancingor the openingofnew and
expensive hospitals and outpatient facilities, Blue Cross requests for increases in its
community rates, strikes, demonstrations, scandals and lawsuits, and the threat of
epidemics, notablyinfluenza in 1947 and 1976, polio in the 1940s and early 1950s, and
AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s.
Few of the instances when public health politics intersected with general politics
have resulted in lasting changes in policy or institutional arrangements. Even public
health crises have not precipitated institutional change, as they did in the nineteenth
century. Biggs succeeded in requiring reluctant physicians to report new cases of
tuberculosisbecause leaders ofgeneralpolitics perceived the highmortalityfrom the
disease as a threat to the voters who returned them to office. He was able to make
permanent the temporary laboratory he established to manufacture diphtheria
antitoxin in 1894 because he persuaded the leaders ofgeneral politics that the logic
of the new bacteriology made it necessary for the city to provide resources that did
not exist in the private sector.
In the twentieth century, however, public health crises have been occasions for
visible public management rather than for fundamental changes in policies. There
appear to be two reasons for this difference in the effects ofcrisis. The first is that, in
the nineteenth century, proposals for innovation in response to public health crises
appeared to have a high probability of success and relatively low costs: report a
disease; isolate a contagious person; manufacture an antitoxin. The single best
example is the creation of the city health department itself in response to an
epidemic of cholera. In contrast, it has been much more difficult to devise low-cost
permanentpolicies to pay or to limit the costs that result from the cumulative burden
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ofchronic disease (including such chronic infections asvenereal disease and AIDS).
Strikes and racial tensions are no more preventable or amenable to negotiation and
moral principles in health care settings than anywhere else. Scandals are endemic
wherever money flows as a result ofpublic policy. Crises led to significant changes in
policy only when a vaccine became available, as it did for polio, or for a condition
such as retrolental fibroplasia (blindness innewborns as aresultofthe use ofmedical
oxygen), for which an easy remedy was available once the cause was detected. It
became difficult even to create and resolve a neighborhood crisis over an isolated
victim ofdiphtheria or scarletfever after 1943,when, forverygood scientific reasons,
the Department of Health abandoned the practice of placarding the homes of
personswith these diseases [12].
A second reason that the occasional convergence of public health and general
politics has not led to major changes in policy is the changing role ofcrises in public
government. For more than half a century, issues have only received significant
attention in general-purpose city government after they have been defined as crises.
Creatingcredible crises hasbecome the bestway for officials orfor interest groups to
escalate an issue on a crowded city political agenda. Political leaders define their
purpose in managing a crisis as making it recede with the maximum credit to
themselves and the minimum memorable harm to substantial groups ofvoters. In a
political environment in which most crises are made by clever people who are angry
or upset, it is highly practical to define success in crisis management as some
combination of reallocating resources and obtaining favorable attention from the
media.
Since creating a crisis is at best only temporarily effective in raising the salience of
issues on the agenda of city politics, leaders of the public health enterprise have
devised other political styles to achieve their goals. One style I call the politics of
accretion; the other, the politics of reform. Taken together, these three political
styles-crisis, accretion, and reform-have provided leaders in the public health
enterprise with an arsenal ofpolitical weapons.
The three styles, as I present them below, are descriptive models. In other words,
they are abstractions intended to clarify masses ofdata. Leaders ofthe public health
enterprise have not chosen to employ apolitics ofcrisis or accretion or reform on any
particular day. My argument is simplythat most oftheirbehavior since the 1930s can
be grouped under one ofthe three styles, orunder some combination ofthem.
THE POLITICS OF ACCRETION
Accretion has been the most frequent and, in many ways, the most successful,
political style in the enterprise ofpublic health in New York City. The most skillful
adherents of this style have caused a great many resources to be allocated to public
health and havevastly expanded the scope ofpublic health practice.
The politics of accretion, its advocates claim, has hardly anything to do with
general politics. It is primarily about the use of the best scientific knowledge to
measure the illness and the health ofpopulations and to implement those measures
that reduce the former and improve the latter. A classic description ofthis style was
the remark of one former health commissioner, Mary McLaughlin, talking about
another, Leona Baumgartner. "Mayor Wagner gave Leona everything she asked
for," Dr. McLaughlin claimed, "and she never had to playpolitics" [13].
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Some advocates of the politics of accretion have believed, like Dr. McLaughlin,
that the most important public health policies can be deduced from scientific
knowledge; others have been more cynical, using science as a more defensible
rationalization for their policy preferences than either ideology or a subjective (or
partisan) concern for a particular group ofpeople. All of them, however, insist that
the enterprise ofpublic health must expand gradually and steadily. Moreover, they
have been less concerned with the organizational structure of the agencies adminis-
tering the enterprise than with insisting that it is axiomatic that appointments in
these agencies be made on the basis ofprofessional criteria rather than the loyalties
or demographic imperatives ofpartisan politics.
The politics of accretion has led to an impressive record of innovations in the
enterprise ofpublic health in New York City. Most of these innovations have taken
the form of new services or outreach to new populations. Here are a few examples
from the hundreds available in the records of the City's Department of Health:
public health nurses assigned to domestic relations court (1929); neighborhood
clinics and integrated service centers (late 1920s on); maternity and infant care
(augmented with federal Social Security funds in the 1930s, with funds for armed
services dependents in World War II, and with city funds after the war); diagnostic
centers for cancer and other diseases (early 1950s); family planning (1940s on);
diabetes control (1950s); fluoridation of the water supply (1964).
In chronic disease management, accretion occurred mainly outside the city health
department until the 1950s. In the mid-1930s, the Hospital Commissioner, Sigmund
S. Goldwater(a former HealthCommissioner, Superintendent ofMt. Sinai Hospital,
and an architect of Blue Cross), collaborating with the Rockefeller Foundation,
persuaded the medical schools of Columbia and New York Universities to establish
research and teaching programs at a new public hospital for patients with chronic
diseases. In the 1940s, the Health Department, using federal funds, established
programs for crippled children and for cancer prevention.
The politics of accretion also characterized the expansion of the governmental
responsibilities for the environment. Again, here is a brief chronological summary:
intervention to measure noise levels (1929); expanded sanitarian services (1930s); a
study ofsmoke hazards and other toxins (federal relief funds, 1930s), poison control
(1930s and 1940s), and radiation hazard inspection and control (1940s and 1950s).
Thepractitioners ofthepolitics ofaccretion have often complained that New York
City was underspending for public health. In 1933, New York's $.63 per person was
less than the$.70 to $1.45spentbyothermajorcities. Even in 1944, after a decade of
La Guardia's reform administration, per capita expenditure for public health in the
city had risen to only $.88: less than in Washington, D.C., Boston, Detroit, or
Milwaukee, though more than in Philadelphia or Los Angeles.
Other practitioners of the politics ofpublic health used such comparative data to
question the effectiveness of accretion as a political style. Even under La Guardia,
public health had not been a major priority of city politics. The politics of public
health reform was an alternative to the politics of accretion.
THE POLITICS OF REFORM
Practitioners ofthepolitics ofreform have, for six decades, called for thoroughgo-
ingchanges in thepolicies that affect the health ofthe public. Many reformers have,
over these decades, begun their advocacy by insisting that a precondition for
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adequate public health policies is substantial renovation of the system by which
health services are organized and paid for in the United States. Almost all of these
advocates have insisted that a universal solution to financing health services, usually
under a national health insurance program, is an important initial step toward
improving the health ofthe public. In the 1930s, some leading reformers insisted that
public provision of old age pensions, what became Social Security, must precede
national health insurance: that adequate income made possible better nutrition and
housing and thus better health. In the 1940s, reformers supported the various
national health programs that were proposed in Congress. In the 1950s, some of
them endorsed, as a temporary expedient, a combination of voluntary health
insurance, social insurance for the elderly, and welfare benefits for the poor. A
decade later, when this expedient became national policy during the Johnson
administration, the reformers regarded it as the first installment of an imminent
national system ofcomprehensive health insurance.
The practitioners of the politics of reform also made proposals for thoroughgoing
change in New York City. Some ofthese changes would be in the structure ofpublic
agencies; others would alter methods of financing services, especially for the poor.
The earliest example I have found of a reformist call for structural change was an
appraisal ofthe City's DepartmentofHealth in 1933 by acommitteeoftheAmerican
Public Health Association. The committee found that the Department "urgently"
needed "capable leadership." The dire situation of the Department demanded "a
newphilosophy" aswell as much more money [14]. Insubsequent decades, advocates
of reform called for such changes as reorganizing the city's hospitals in a separate
public benefit corporation, requiring medical schools and voluntary teaching hospi-
tals to give higher priority to health care for the poor, and creating a superagency to
bring better management to the city agencies with responsibility for health and the
environment.
The reformist political style was also evident in proposals to change the organiza-
tion and financing of health services for significant groups of New Yorkers. Many
reformers supported the Health Insurance Plan, organized initially for city workers
in the third La Guardia administration. In the 1960s, many of them regarded the
neighborhood health centers sponsored by the federal anti-poverty program as
precursors of a future system ofprepayment and group practice that was sensitive to
the needs ofblack and Hispanicpeople.
Manyparticipants in the politics ofaccretion also supported innovationspromoted
by the reformers. The three styles of public health politics have not been mutually
exclusive. But the priorities of the accretors and the reformers have been different.
They were sometimes different as a result of ideology; but more often as a result of
who paidwhose salaries. Itwas easier for a medical school faculty member or a labor
leader thanfor a civil servant tobe a reformer. Attimes, moreover, itwaspossible for
both accretors and reformers topractice thepolitics ofcrisis, especiallythevariant of
it that emerged in the 1960s.
THE NEW POLITICS OF CRISIS
As I described earlier, the politics of public health crises has had a venerable
history in New York City. By the early 1950s, most ofthe practitioners ofthe politics
of accretion and of reform believed that crises caused by epidemics would no longer
occur. "Major epidemics have disappeared," declared Leona Baumgartner in 1966,
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in an address commemorating "One Hundred Years of Health" in New York City
[15]. During the previous decade, public health officials in the city had redefined the
concept of crisis to take account of this self-evident new reality. As early as 1955,
Baumgartner insisted to the mayor that the importance of the outbreaks of polio
earlier in the decade had been exaggerated. She called attention to what she called
new "crises" caused by the increasing burdenofchronic disease and the explosion in
health care costs [16]. Her successors as Commissioner of Health advanced similar
arguments. Almost all ofthem talked ofcrises-but they meant crises offinance and
administration that were translated into inadequate access to health services for
large numbers ofpeople.
Bythe late 1960s and early 1970s, that is, the leadingpractitioners ofthe politics of
accretion believed that the only new crises would be those that alarmed the
advocates of the politics of reform. Crises would now result from the burden of
chronic illness in an aging population, from growing numbers of poor mothers and
children, from the inadequacy ofhealth care for the unemployed and the marginally
employed, and from the proliferation of toxic substances in the environment. Many
of the public health professionals who preferred to use the politics of accretion
applauded the efforts of health officials in the Lindsay administration to gain
administrative control of federally subsidized health planning and to bring the
techniques of systems analysis to bear on the intractable social and health problems
of the city. Their colleagues who preferred the politics of reform insisted that
planning and analysis were woefully inadequate substitutes for massive governmen-
tal reorganization and the infusion ofnew money.
The severe fiscal crisis of the last half of the 1970s, which absorbed the attention
and the resources of public officials in the city and the state, made it necessary for
both accretionists and reformers tosuspend temporarily action on theiragendas. For
a time, there was only a more rudimentary politics of personal and institutional
survival. Avoiding retrenchment became the priority of employees in both agencies
of the public sector and voluntary organizations dependent on public funds. For a
time, the political salience of public health was lower than it had been during the
severe economic depression ofthe early 1930s.
HAVE ACCRETION, REFORM, AND CRISIS BECOME OBSOLETE
STYLES?
The AIDS crisis, first perceived in the early 1980s, initially confounded practitio-
ners of all three of the political styles that had been employed by public health
activists in New York City in this century. Accretionists had, especially until the late
1980s, verylittle scientific achievement onwhich tobase their advocacyforadditional
resources. Reformers had a difficult time convincing themselves that far-reaching
change in the organization and financing of services could be achieved with a
conservative administration in Washington. Those who believed that change oc-
curred in response to administrative and financial crises that were intensified by the
political action ofinterest groupswere confrontedwith acrisis caused, unexpectedly,
by avirus that was transmitted as a result ofhuman behavior.
People do not easily change political styles that have been serviceable and
personally rewarding over many years. Thus it is likely that the 1990s will still be
dominated by accretionists insisting that good science should be translated into
policy, by reformers hoping that the national mood and therefore the majority
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coalition will shift in their favor, and bystrategists ofcrisisworrying about howmany
simultaneous crises general politicians can manage without diminishing the intensity
oftheir concern. As has happened many times before in the history ofpublic health
in New York City, the shrewd use of political styles will most likely lead either to
what, in retrospect, will appear to be significant changes or to the accretion of
responsibilities and resources bythe public health enterprise.
Two questions remain. One is whether the three styles-accretion, reform, and
crisis-remain serviceable in the 1990s. Thatis,will theycontinue toprovide income,
allies, personal satisfaction, and even changes in public policy for their adherents?
My guess is that, in New York City in 1991, adherents ofeach style are mainly going
through the motions; repeating political behavior that has been satisfying, lucrative,
and sometimes even successful in the past. I suspect that significant change in public
health policy will require new styles and that these will emerge from new political
coalitions that will redefine the priorities and, once again, the definition of public
health. I have recently begun to write about this change, in the hope of helping it to
occur [17].
The second question iswhether the theory ofpolitical styles in public health that I
have presented here has any relevance outside New York City. I think that it does
and have limited myargument inthispapertoNewYorkCityboth forcoherence and
because, as a result ofparticipating in several collaborative research projects, I have
been immersed in data about public health in New York in recent years [18]. Many
New Yorkers and a great many people outside the city insist that New York is
different from the rest of the United States. It may be bigger, dirtier, and, on some
streets, more dangerous than other cities. But, after living most of my adult life
elsewhere, I have decided that the argument that politics, ofany kind, are special in
New York City is practically and conceptuallywrong. It is wrong in political practice
because it encourages New Yorkers to hope that they will be left alone by the state
and the federal government exceptwhen subsidies are awarded, while givingofficials
inAlbany and thefederalgovernment an excuse tobe miserlywith those subsidies. It
is conceptually wrong because it permits New Yorkers to ignore policies "not
invented here" while they busily invent the same or similar policies. I find consider-
able evidence that accretion, reform, and crisis have been the dominant political
styles in otherjurisdictions [19]. Thus I offermymodels forbroader discussion and, I
hope, refinement.
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